The potential cost of a failed doha round: by Bouet, Antoine & Debucquet, David Laborde
 
 
IFPRI Discussion Paper 00886 
July 2009 
The Potential Cost of a Failed Doha Round 
Antoine Bouët 
David Laborde Debucquet  
 
Markets, Trade and Institutions Division  INTERNATIONAL FOOD POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE 
The International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) was established in 1975. IFPRI is one of 15 
agricultural research centers that receive principal funding from governments, private foundations, and 
international and regional organizations, most of which are members of the Consultative Group on 
International Agricultural Research (CGIAR). 
FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTORS AND PARTNERS 
IFPRI’s research, capacity strengthening, and communications work is made possible by its financial 
contributors and partners. IFPRI receives its principal funding from governments, private foundations, 
and international and regional organizations, most of which are members of the Consultative Group on 
International Agricultural Research (CGIAR). IFPRI gratefully acknowledges the generous unrestricted 
funding from Australia, Canada, China, Finland, France, Germany, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, 




Antoine Bouët, International Food Policy Research Institute 
Senior Research Fellow, Markets, Trade and Institutions Division  
Email: a.bouet@cgiar.org  
 
David Laborde Debucquet, International Food Policy Research Institute 
Research Fellow, Markets, Trade and Institutions Division  
Email: d.laborde@cgiar.org  
Notices 
1 Effective January 2007, the Discussion Paper series within each division and the Director General’s Office of IFPRI 
were merged into one IFPRI–wide Discussion Paper series. The new series begins with number 00689, reflecting the 
prior publication of 688 discussion papers within the dispersed series. The earlier series are available on IFPRI’s 
website at www.ifpri.org/pubs/otherpubs.htm#dp. 
2 IFPRI Discussion Papers contain preliminary material and research results, and have been peer reviewed by at 
least two reviewers—internal and/or external. They are circulated in order to stimulate discussion and critical 
comment. 
Copyright 2009 International Food Policy Research Institute. All rights reserved. Sections of this document may be reproduced for 
noncommercial and not-for-profit purposes without the express written permission of, but with acknowledgment to, the International 







3.  Alternative scenarios and methodology  8 
4.  Results  13 
5.  Conclusion 23 
Appendix A. Sector and Geographic Decomposition  24 
Appendix B. Modeling the OTDS Constraint in a Dynamic Setting  26 
Appendix C. Most favored nation tariff increases, 1995-2006  28 
Reference  29 
 iv 
List of Tables 
1.    Frequency of most favored nation tariff increases, 1995-2006 (percent)  6 
2.    Protection applied on imports, by country category and scenario  14 
3.    Protection faced by exports, by country category and scenario  15 
4.    Global changes in exports and welfare by scenario, 2025  16 
5.   Changes in value of exports by scenario compared with baseline, 2025 (percent)  18 
6.    Changes in welfare by scenario compared with baseline, 2025  19 
7.   Changes in factor remunerations for three scenarios compared with baseline, 2025 (percent)  21 
A.1.   Regional aggregation  24 
A.2.   Sectoral aggregation  25 
B.1.   Agricultural export and production variations under the DDA scenario, with and                                     
without dynamic OTDS constraints  27 
C.1.   Frequency of increases in most favored nation tariffs, 1995-2006  28 
 
List of Figures 
1.    Trade disputes handled by the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body, 1995-2008  5 
2.    Average world tariffs by scenario, 2025 levels  13 
3.    Relative impacts of foreign and domestic policies on welfare results, Up-to-the Max scenario  20 
 v 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
We thank participants at a German Marshall Fund Seminar (December 2009, Washington DC), as well as 
Luca Salvatici and an anonymous referee for comments and suggestions on an earlier version of this 
paper. The authors are grateful to the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation for the generous financial 
support that made this work possible. The usual disclaimer applies.  
 vi 
ABSTRACT 
This study offers new conclusions on the economic cost of a failed Doha Round. The first section is 
devoted to an analysis of how trade policies evolve in the long and medium runs. We show that even 
under normal economic conditions, policymakers modify tariffs to cope with the evolution of world 
markets. We then use the MIRAGE Computable General Equilibrium model to assess the potential 
outcome of the Doha Round, and then examine four protectionist scenarios. Under a scenario where 
applied tariffs of major economies increase up to the currently bound tariff rates, we find that world trade 
decreases by 7.7 percent and world welfare drops by US$353 bn. We then compare a resort to 
protectionism when the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) is implemented versus a resort to 
protectionism when the DDA is not implemented. We find that this trade agreement could prevent the 
potential loss of US$ 809 bn of trade, and could therefore act as an efficient multilateral insurance scheme 
against the adverse consequences of “beggar-thy-neighbor” trade policies. 
 
Keywords:  trade negotiations, CGE modeling, bound duties, domestic support 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
After seven years of negotiations, participants at the July 2008 mini-ministerial meeting of the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) in Geneva were unable to reach final agreement on the Doha Round 
liberalization modalities. Conflicts still exist over the commitments to be made by both developed and 
developing countries. For instance, the United States (US) is still reluctant to tackle the issue of domestic 
support to the cotton sector, while India and other developing countries want to avoid restrictions (e.g., 
the anti-concentration clause) on their ability to use flexibility in nonagricultural market access (NAMA) 
negotiations. Beyond these very specific disagreements, it seems that incentives to conclude the Doha 
Round are weak. Because large market access gains have already been achieved in the manufacturing 
sectors of developed-country markets (Martin and Messerlin 2007), the impetus that existed in previous 
multilateral negotiations has vanished. In addition, the remaining issues are more difficult to negotiate, 
the political costs are high, and the gains are more difficult to assess. For developed countries, 
liberalization of agricultural markets remains a highly complex issue. At the same time, developing 
countries want to maintain protection in manufacturing and avoid making new commitments regarding 
services based on nascent industry considerations. Finally, regional and bilateral liberalizations have 
reduced the market access gains expected by key players, fostering resistance to multilateral 
liberalizations that will erode existing preferences. Consequently, the longer the negotiations last, the 
weaker the incentives to conclude a successful round. 
In parallel, impact assessments using a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model have 
provided increasingly accurate quantitative information concerning the gains and losses associated with 
the Doha Development Agenda (DDA). Great improvements have been made since the Uruguay Round 
assessment, where a lack of information on tariffs led to an overestimation of potential gains. However, 
improved information has shown that the gains from the Doha Round are  likely to be lower than 
expected (Bouët 2008). The current models capture the fact that in most cases, applied tariffs are lower 
than their most favored nation (MFN)-bound level due to binding overhang (the gap between MFN bound 
and applied rates) and preferences (the gap between MFN and bilateral applied rates). In addition, the 
implementation of trade scenarios has become increasingly more precise, providing new detail and 
showing the existence of numerous flexibilities and exceptions that will limit the scope of liberalization 
(Jean, Laborde and Martin 2008).  
The shrinking gains associated with the Doha Round have led both economists and policymakers 
to state that the real gains will go far beyond tariff-reduction effects and should be sought outside the 
standard model. For example, although gains in productivity, service liberalization, and trade facilitation 
may account for a large share of the positive effects of a successful round, they are only weakly 
represented in the CGE modeling exercises. Moreover, even if applied tariffs are not cut, the binding of 
tariff lines and reductions in the existing binding overhangs should have significant value in providing a 
more stable trade environment.   
The goal of this study is not to uncover additional benefits associated with the DDA, but rather to 
re-examine the value of an agreement by considering potential gains and losses against a moving 
landscape of trade policies. Traditional impact studies have assessed the potential gains of the Doha 
negotiations by comparing the consequences of negotiation modalities with the status quo. Therefore, the 
cost of failed negotiations has been seen strictly as an opportunity cost representing unrealized gains. This 
approach, however, may underestimate the real losses that could be associated with failure of the DDA. 
Such a drastic event would make the business-as-usual scenario uncertain because the status quo does not 
provide a long-term perspective on trade policies. The current trend of multilateral trade liberalization 
may not survive this failure; consequently, the global public good provided by the WTO—which helps to 
free trade in a stable and less-distorted environment—may vanish. This study therefore compares the 
effects of a DDA scenario with other relevant alternatives.  
To this end, we examine six protectionist scenarios characterized by different approaches to the 
implementation of protectionism (multilateralism vs. regionalism vs. a combination of both approaches) 2 
at different orders of magnitude. Throughout the study, we take into account the commitments enforced 
through the current trading system, which limit the capacities of WTO members to impede international 
trade—in particular through binding border protection. As part of this study, we develop a new database 
of global trade protection for the period 1995-2006; this allows us to examine the degree to which tariff 
barriers have decreased since the creation of the WTO and to determine the maximum tariffs for the time 
period on which the study’s protectionist scenario is based. We also use the MacMapHS6v2 database of 
applied and bound protection in 2004 to define another protectionist scenario characterized by the 
implementation of the highest protection authorized by the current multilateral system. 
These tariff scenarios are implemented using a multicountry, multisector dynamic model called 
Modeling International Relationships in Applied General Equilibrium (MIRAGE), which was initially 
developed at Paris’s Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales (CEPII). This CGE 
model of the world economy enables us to evaluate the economic consequences of both cooperative and 
noncooperative outcomes. We find that the difference between cooperative and noncooperative scenarios 
represents a potential loss of US$2,261 bn in trade (in constant terms) based on bound tariffs, and 
US$1,170 bn based on the maximum tariffs implemented between 1995 and 2006. 
To take another perspective, we then consider the WTO agreement as an insurance scheme 
against potential trade wars; to do this, we compare scenarios of protectionism with and without 
implementation of the DDA. Our findings show that this trade agreement could prevent the potential loss 
of US$809 bn of trade and therefore acts as an efficient multilateral insurance scheme against the adverse 
consequences of “beggar-thy-neighbor” trade policies. The reference scenario has countries adopting 
bound duties; if, however, they adopt the highest tariffs implemented between 1995 and 2006, the 
insurance scheme is worth US$581 bn. These new findings clearly reappraise the potential cost of a failed 
Doha Round. As stated by Pascal Lamy in his speech at the Lowy Institute (March 2, 2009; Sydney): “the 
Doha Round is the most effective way to further constrain protectionist pressures by reducing the gap 
between bound commitments and applied policies.”
1 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: section 2 details our motivation for 
undertaking this study. Section 3 describes the utilized methodology. Section 4 presents the results of the 
various scenarios, both in terms of the level of border protection and in terms of the economic impact, and 
section 5 offers conclusions.  
 
                                                      
1 See: http://www.lowyinstitute.org/Publication.asp?pid=985. 3 
2. BACKGROUND 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a detailed background to the study. We undertake a new 
assessment of the Doha Round based on the most recent modalities, while also evaluating completely 
different trade scenarios intended to estimate the potential cost of a resort to worldwide protectionism. We 
believe that these latter scenarios are realistic for a number of reasons. 
To begin, we consider the recent wave of protectionist and “beggar-thy-neighbor” policies 
adopted since early 2008 and conclude that there is no straightforward evidence indicating that the threat 
of trade wars has recently increased. Then, we examine historical data on world protectionism and find 
that trade policies offer a moving landscape, in both the medium- and long-terms. Finally, we review the 
economic literature and examine the rationale for these up-and-down variations in applied protection. 
Has Protectionism Recently Increased? 
It has often been stated that protectionism has risen among WTO members since September 2008, 
through a mix of increased MFN duties and nontariff barriers, and the proliferation of antidumping duties. 
Here are some examples of these new border measures, as told to us by WTO staff members: 
•  Argentina recently imposed nonautomatic licensing requirements on products such as auto 
parts, textiles, televisions, toys, shoes, and leather goods. 
•  India reportedly raised tariffs on some steel products in November 2008.   
•  On November 17, 2008, Mercosur member countries (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and 
Uruguay) decided to raise their common external tariff by 5 percentage points on numerous 
items, including wine, peaches, dairy products, textiles, leather goods, and wooden furniture.  
•  On November 26, 2008, Ecuador raised its tariffs 5 to 20 percentage points on 940 products 
ranging from butter, turkey, crackers, and caramels to blenders, cell phones, eyeglasses, 
sailboats, building materials, and transport equipment.  
•  Russia (which is not a WTO member) has announced plans to raise import tariffs on cars and 
harvesters, and continues to impose Sanitary and Phyto-Sanitary (SPS) measures.  
•  The Ukrainian Parliament is considering raising applied tariffs. 
•  In December 2008, the Government of Indonesia implemented a regulation stating that 
imports on 500 individual tariff lines—including textiles, toys, and electronics— will require 
special licenses to be conditionally granted upon the approval of domestic producers. 
•  In December 2008, the Republic of Korea announced that its tariffs on the importation of 
crude oil would increase from 1 to 3 percent beginning in March 2009. 
•  The European Union announced its intention to re-introduce export subsidies for some dairy 
products as of late January 2009. 
These are border measures, but numerous “bail-out” measures—apparently related to the banking 
and financial crisis—have also been adopted. On January 28, 2009, the US House of Representative 
introduced a “Buy American” provision under its stimulus plan, requiring that all public projects funded 
by the plan use only iron and steel produced in the US. In early February 2009, the US Senate debated a 
provision to expand the requirement from iron and steel to all manufactured products. President Obama 
persuaded the Senate to water down the provision, which was passed as part of the stimulus package on 
February 10, 2009. However, the Berry Amendment was extended, stipulating that the Departments of 
Defense and Homeland Security must purchase military clothing and other uniform-destined textiles from 
US firms. US 4 
Some of the plans recently implemented to help domestic industries or other service sectors hit by 
the economic crisis have been criticized as creating biased incentives for domestic firms. For example, a 
provision in the French plan aimed at funding the car industry was highly criticized because it required 
publicly funded firms to develop electric car-building capacities inside the national territory. The 
Indonesian plan to mitigate the effects of the global crisis includes measures that appear to favor domestic 
companies, such as a regulation containing a provision that all foreign drug importers must build a 
manufacturing plant within five years. Other examples include Italian subsidies to parmesan cheese 
producers, Swedish aid to Saab and Volvo, the Brazilian Central Bank’s assistance to farming exporters, 
and the Chilean plan to help small exporters. All these measure, which in one way or another subsidize 
domestic firms, are questionable in terms of their compatibility with WTO law, especially if they survive 
the crisis (Bhagwati and Panagarya, in Baldwin and Evenett 2008). The WTO authorizes domestic 
subsidies that aim to restructure businesses, promote innovation, or assist displaced workers (Hufbauer 
and Schott, in Baldwin and Evenett 2008), but it is not always clear whether the use of these measures is 
linked to the financial crisis. All border measures are WTO-compatible, and some “bail-out” measures, if 
temporary, may be WTO-compatible. Hufbauer and Schott (2009) consider that “if the Buy American 
provisions are applied to signatory parties of the GPA or to NAFTA partners (Mexico and Canada), they 
would violate US obligations” (Hufbauer and Schott 2009, pg. 5).2 
While “bail-out” and restructuring measures may be understood as attempts to circumvent the 
disastrous economic impact of the banking and financial crisis, we do not see a recent increase of 
“beggar-thy-neighbor” protectionist policies. Most of the figures indicating increasing import tariffs or 
antidumping procedures do not make temporal comparisons (e.g., the report to the Trade Policy Review 
Body [TPRB] by WTO staff), or they use 2007 as a reference year for comparison. The monthly 
newsletter of the Institute for the Integration of Latin America and the Caribbean (INTAL) states that 
“according to the information from the International Trade Centre (ITC) and the WTO, during the first 
half of 2008 the number of antidumping cases raised by 40 percent” (INTAL 2009, 4). The newsletter, 
however, does not specify whether this refers to an increase since the first half of 2007, nor does it 
provide any medium-term references. Gamberoni and Newfarmer (2009) affirm that after a period of 
slowdown, the number of antidumping cases (in terms of both investigations initiated and imposition of 
duties) surged in 2008, particularly in the second half of the year. Furthermore, the authors find that 
compared with 2007, antidumping initiations grew by 15 percent, and findings with impositions of duties 
grew by 22 percent. Again, however, it is not clear that 2007 is the correct year for comparison.  
Figure 1 indicates trade disputes handled by the WTO from 1995 to 2008. Given that seasonal 
variations are large, the data are aggregated into four consecutive quarters. Of course, a lag exists between 
the time that a protectionist measure was implemented and the time a complaint was filed. As a result, the 
observed increase in the number of trade disputes during the last quarter of 2008 might reflect the 
increase in antidumping procedures noted in early 2008. However, this phenomenon is not unique; it also 
occurred in 2000 and 2002. 
                                                      
2 The GPA is the WTO’s Government Procurement Agreement, and NAFTA is the North American Free Trade Agreement, 
which involves the United States, Canada, and Mexico.  5 
Figure 1.  Trade disputes handled by the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body, 1995-2008 
 
Source:  WTO website (http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_status_e.htm) 
Note:  Data are aggregated into four consecutive quarters to account for large seasonal variations. 
It should be noted, however, that it is difficult to obtain reliable information on these matters. For 
example, WTO staff members refer to protectionist measures, but concede that “the information on 
changes in trade policies and trade-related policies contained in this report has been collected by the 
Secretariat from a variety of public and official sources. In some cases it has been possible to verify the 
information through formal channels, but in most cases it has not.” (WTO Secretariat, 2009, Para. 5)   
The Moving Landscape of Trade Policies 
It has often been stated that pressure for protectionism is cyclical. Although this statement is difficult to 
support with concrete evidence, it has been reliably demonstrated that protectionism was cyclical in rich 
countries from the end of the 18th to the middle of the 20th century (see Messerlin 1985; Bairoch 1995 
and Irwin 1992 among others). However, it is unclear whether this applies to all countries throughout the 
world, because no historical database on applied protection exists at the global level. In addition, a 
decreasing national average can hide increases in tariffs at the product level. For these reasons, we herein 
examine the frequency of yearly tariff increases in 164 countries between 1995 and 2006 using the 
TRAINS (TRade Analysis and INformation System) database.
3  
At the global level, the frequency of tariff increases is significant in all sectors, even though, at 
close to 5 percent, it isn’t large. While this frequency is higher than 20 percent in the case of five 
countries (see Table C.1, Appendix C), tariff increases are generally more frequent in the agricultural 
sector.4 This is particularly true in rich countries, such as the EU, the US, and Japan, as well as in 
Norway and middle-income countries such as Poland and the Ukraine. In Norway, for example, while 
annual tariff increases occurred in only 0.2 percent of all nonagricultural cases from 1995 to 2006, they 
were noted in 22 percent of agricultural cases. 
                                                      
3 Given that the ad-valorem equivalent of specific tariffs may vary due to modification of unit values, combined with the 
fact that we focus on discretionary variations of import duties, we neutralize the effect of unit value variations.  Appendix Table 
C.1 gives some of these calculations.  
4 Due to the volatility of agricultural prices, governments adjust trade policies more frequently. This is consistent with the 
political economy model used to define trade policy scenarios; in the Jean, Laborde, and Martin (2008) model, lobbies have 
domestic price targets. 6 
Table 1.  Frequency of most favored nation tariff increases, 1995-2006 (percent) 
A.   All sectors            
      WTO  4.66  LDCs  4.09  MICs   5.18  OECD  3.32 
      Non-WTO   5.30  Non-LDCs   4.89  Non-MICs   3.80  Non-OECD  4.93 
B.  NAMA               
      WTO   4.46  LDCs   4.06  MICs   5.01  OECD   2.58 
      Non-WTO  4.99  Non-LDCs   4.64  Non-MICs   3.50  Non-OECD   4.79 
C.    AMA            
     WTO   6.00  LDCs   4.29  MICs  6.24  OECD  8.36 
     Non WTO   6.97  Non-LDCs  6.55  Non-MICs  5.81  Non-OECD  5.81 
Sources:  TRade Analysis and INformation System (TRAINS) database and authors’ calculations. 
Notes: WTO indicates World Trade Organization; NAMA, nonagricultural market access; AMA, agricultural 
market access; LDCs, least-developed countries; MICs, middle-income countries; and OECD, Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development. 
Does this behavior differ across countries according to specific characteristics? In particular, is 
WTO membership or the level of national income associated with the level or frequency of MFN tariff 
increases? Table 1 provides some answers by displaying the frequency of MFN tariff increases from 1995 
to 2006 based on whether or not countries are WTO members; whether or not they are classified as least-
developed countries (LDCs), middle-income countries (MICs), or members of the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD); and whether the calculations are for all sectors, for 
agricultural sectors, or for nonagricultural sectors. 
From this, we see that the propensity to augment MFN tariffs is lower among WTO members 
compared with non-WTO members, and it is lower in industry than in agriculture. It appears that LDCs
5 
raised their MFN tariffs less frequently than the world average, while MICs did so more often. The 
propensity of OECD countries to augment their MFN tariffs was low in industry but relatively high in 
agriculture (i.e., higher than in the cases of MICs and LDCs).   
Economic Crisis, Trade Wars, and Retaliations  
The current financial crisis ostensibly fosters demand for protectionism and could lead to new 
trade barriers, as occurred after the October 1929 crisis. A parallel can easily be drawn between the 
current situation and the one that existed then; in the early 1930s, unemployment was rising, fear of 
deflation prevailed, and a lack of public resources (which was more pronounced in countries that paid war 
reparations) prevented governments from remedying the economic crisis. Moreover, as in 1930, the 
current context of decreasing prices can mechanically reinforce protection because specific duties (which 
are defined as monetary amounts by physical units, and are numerous in agriculture) become increasingly 
more restrictive when world prices are down. In this type of economic context, protectionism is a 
tempting policy instrument for policymakers; it increases domestic prices, supports domestic activity, and 
provides new public income … albeit short-sightedly. In the Republican platform of the 1928 presidential 
election, the tariff was presented as the “household remedy” (Isaacs 1948), in that it was aimed at 
increasing domestic prices and economic activity. However, the role of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act and 
the subsequent tariff retaliations in the decline of trade after 1930 should not be overestimated. Recent 
evaluations (Irwin 1998; Madsen 2001) show that discretionary increases in tariff rates only explain a 
minor part of the post-1929 contraction of trade. For example, Madsen (2001) estimates that, from 1929 
                                                      
5 These findings are consistent with those from previous reports (e.g., Laborde 2008) emphasizing the fact that LDCs have 
less sophisticated trade policies than more developed economies, in particular due to the lack of administrative capacity. 7 
to 1932, real world trade declined by approximately 14 percent because of decreasing national incomes, 
by 8 percent because of discretionary tariff increases, by 5 percent because of deflation-induced tariff 
increases, and by 6 percent as a result of nontariff barriers. 
It has been theoretically and empirically proven that trade openness is employment-creating and 
income-supporting in sectors in which an economy has a comparative advantage, but that it has a negative 
impact on employment and incomes in sectors where the economy has a comparative disadvantage. This 
implies that trade openness leads to restructuring of an economy (which can be costly) and is less 
unpopular in times of economic growth. During economic recession, the job market provides fewer 
opportunities, and any threat to existing jobs is perceived negatively. In times of stagnation, lobbying for 
protection will increase above the usual levels in sectors lacking a comparative advantage, especially 
when those sectors are small and geographically/socially homogenous (Olson 1965). This explains why 
demand for protection is currently so strong in the US automobile and textile/apparel sectors, in the 
European agricultural and automobile sectors, in the Japanese agricultural sector, and so on. 
Finally, governments do not always correctly anticipate world retaliation and counter-retaliation, 
as was the case with the US in 1930 and also last year when, in the middle of the food crisis, governments 
implemented export bans and export restrictions in successive rounds of retaliation and counter-
retaliation. The economic theory of retaliation concludes the following: 
•  A trade war does not systematically eliminate all trade (Johnson 1953). 
•  Policy instruments are not equivalent; in particular, quantitative restrictions are more 
damaging than tariff barriers (Tower 1975). 
•  Large countries can benefit from a trade war, while small countries always lose (Johnson 
1953); this point is noted by Hadi Soesastro (in Baldwin and Evenett 2009) when he states 
that the largest economies should be more tempted by protectionism today.  
•  Trade wars may be long and damaging when countries do not identify the originator of the 
process (Axelrod 1981); conversely, countries have to be “nice” in order to reestablish 
cooperation as quickly as possible. 
Finally, there is another factor that should contribute to rising protectionism. The failure to yet 
reach a multilateral trade agreement mainly comes from disagreements between rich and emerging 
countries, for example, between India and the US on the Special Safeguard Mechanism in agriculture; 
between the US and West Africa on cotton; and between the EU and Brazil on tariff reductions in 
agriculture. This clearly defines lines of demarcation that could be the basis for future trade disputes. 
Thus, we see that there is no strong evidence of rising protectionism today, at least up through 
March 2009. However, it is also clear that policymakers have historically changed trade policies in 
reaction to their current economic conditions. In fact, even in the post-World War II period—which is a 
remarkable period of history in terms of the increasing liberalization of trade policies—trading partners 
(including WTO members) have frequently augmented their tariff protection when needed. This is 
particularly true for MICs in all sectors and for OECD countries in agriculture. 8 
3.  ALTERNATIVE SCENARIOS AND METHODOLOGY 
Against this background, we herein seek to compare the magnitude of gains from trade cooperation 
compared with noncooperation, and to explore how a negotiated DDA may be able to protect the world 
trading system from a rise in protectionism. We examine various scenarios comparing the implementation 
of the July 2008 package, including different non cooperative scenarios (i.e., the implementation of bound 
duty levels, the implementation of the highest MFN tariff applied during the 1995-2006 period for each 
importing country and product, etc.) and the implementation of these noncooperative scenarios with and 
without the implementation of the DDA. The last element will indicate how a new trade negotiation could 
insure the world trading system against the risk of trade wars.  
These assessments are carried out using the MIRAGE model of the world economy, with 
protection data derived from the MAcMapHS6 database and a new historical database on applied MFN 
protection. The remainder of this chapter offers an overview of the methodology utilized in this study, 
followed by a detailed description of each of the modeled scenarios.   
Methodology 
Tariff reform is implemented at the disaggregation level of the MacMapHS6v2.1 database (Laborde 
2008) with bound and applied tariff data for 2004 at the HS6 (Harmonized System level 6) product level 
(including 5,113 products, 170 importing countries, and 208 exporting countries).
6 We add several 
updates to account for all major changes that occurred up until 2008, including major regional trade 
agreements (RTAs), new WTO members (such as the Ukraine), and the trade policy consequences of 
ongoing domestic reforms (such as the EU sugar trade reform). The TRAINS database
 is used to 
investigate tariff changes since 1995; a special procedure is adopted to ensure comparability of MFN 
tariff rates between the MacMapHS6 and TRAINS databases. To ensure intertemporal comparison of 
nominal protection, all specific tariffs are converted using the reference group unit values from 
MAcMapHS6v2. However, for the purpose of tariff reduction formula classification, the official 
guidelines for computing unit values are used. All trade policy scenarios are implemented on a yearly 
basis, following the relevant timelines in each case. 
The political economy model developed by Jean, Laborde, and Martin (2008) is used when 
sensitive products are selected to implement tariff scenarios (i.e., in both DDA scenarios and in all FTA 
agreements studied, both for the baseline and relevant scenarios). An extension of this model is used to 
define the binding strategy of developing countries in the DDA scenario. Indeed, for a particular scenario, 
when we combine tariff increases with DDA implementation, it is very important to have a theoretically-
based approach to define the new bound tariffs, particularly for countries that benefit from wide 
flexibilities to achieve their new binding coverage goal (Small and Vulnerable Economies – SVEs – and 
LDCs in particular). In such cases, we replace the base year of the applied tariff (i.e., 2004) with the 
highest tariff during the period 1995-2006 to compute the political cost of any new commitments.
7 Here, 
the DDA modalities (WTO 2008a) define the overall constraints faced by each country. Finally, when 
WTO members liberalize under the DDA, market access for non-WTO members remains unchanged. 
Tariffs are aggregated from the HS6 level to match the aggregation of the model (see below) 
using the reference group weighting scheme methodology (see Boumellassa, Laborde, and Mitaritonna 
2009); the tariffs are then implemented in MIRAGE, assuming perfect competition across all sectors. (A 
full description of the model is available in Decreux and Valin 2007.) Based on standard and robust 
assumptions, it should be noted that the model may underestimate the positive effects of trade reform, 
                                                      
6 Slight modifications have been made to the MAcMapHS6v2.1 dataset: Malaysia’s tariffs on tobacco products are updated 
(lowered), marginal protection on Chinese cereal Tariff Rate Quotas (TRQs) are reduced, and the protection faced on sugar and 
bananas from ACP (African-Caribbean-Pacific) countries in the EU market is modified to better capture preference erosion 
mechanisms. 
7 This affects Equation 6 of the Jean, Laborde and Martin (2008) model.  9 
particularly when such reform drives new investments, technology improvements, or important trade or 
production diversification.  
In each country, a representative consumer maximizes a CES-LES (Constant Elasticity of 
Substitution – Linear Expenditure System) utility function under a budget constraint to allocate his 
income across goods. The origin of goods is determined by a CES nested structure following the 
Armington assumption. In addition, Northern countries are assumed to produce higher-quality industrial 
goods compared with those supplied by Southern countries. On the production side, value-added and 
intermediate goods are complements under a Leontief hypothesis. The value-added is a CES function of 
unskilled labor and a composite of skilled labor and capital, allowing reduced substitutability between the 
last two production factors. In agriculture and mining, production also depends on land and natural 
resources. Investment is savings-driven, and the current account is assumed to be constant in terms of 
global gross domestic product. This last assumption is important because it means that tariff reductions 
(under the DDA scenarios) and tariff increases (under the protectionist scenarios) will have positively 
correlated impacts on both imports and exports for every country. 
Macroeconomic data (such as world trade flows, production, consumption, and intermediate use 
of commodities and services) are derived from the GTAP 7 database. Twenty-seven regions are identified 
in the model (including eight high-income regions), and mapped to the main trade blocks. Sectoral 
decomposition is highly detailed in terms of agriculture and agrifood business (12 sectors) because most 
of the protection is concentrated in this sector. All other sectors are nonagricultural, including 13 
industrial sectors and two service sectors.
8  
A baseline is implemented from 2008 to 2025, depicting the world without a new multilateral 
agreement. Concerning trade reform, the following post-2004 agreements are included in the baseline:  
•  Full free trade agreements (FTA) for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), 
the Monetary and Economic Community of Central Africa (CEMAC), the Common Market 
for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), and the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC); 
•  Economic partnership agreements (EPA) between Asian, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) 
countries and the EU; 
•  Implementation of FTAs between the EU and India, the EU and ASEAN countries, the US 
and Colombia, the US and Oman, the US and Bahrain, the US and Morocco, the US and 
Australia, Mercosur countries and Colombia, and China and Chile; 
•  All ongoing WTO accession commitments, including those of the most recent members 
(Ukraine, Cape Verde, and Vietnam); 
•  An updated Japanese GSP (Generalized System of Preferences) scheme in favor of LDC 
countries; 
•  Modified bound tariffs on EU poultry; 
•  The EU inclusion of Romania and Bulgaria in 2007; and 
•  The end of the EU EBA (Everything But Arms) regime for protocol products (sugar, banana, 
and rice). 
This baseline serves as a point of comparison for all modeled scenarios, and the projected results are 
reported for 2025. The analysis does not account for the surge in world prices for energy and food 
products observed between 2004 and 2008. 
                                                      
8 The sectoral and geographic decomposition is presented in Appendix A, including correspondence with GTAP sectors.  10 
Descriptions of the Modeled Scenarios  
The seven scenarios analyzed herein include the Doha compromise of July 2008, four alternative 
scenarios driven by the failure of negotiations, and two scenarios combining the implementation of the 
Doha compromise of July 2008 and a global resort to protectionism. Specific names and descriptions are 
as follows:  
1.  DDA Scenario: Implementation of the July 2008 DDA modalities. 
2.  Up-to-the-Bound Scenario: Non-FTA applied tariffs are increased to existing bound levels. 
3.  Bound&DDA Scenario: Implementation of the July 2008 DDA modalities, plus increase of 
non-FTA applied tariffs to their new, post-DDA bound levels. 
4.  Up-to-the-Max Scenario: Non-FTA applied tariffs are increased to their maximum level 
since 1995, capped by the existing bound tariffs. 
5.  Max&DDA Scenario: Implementation of the July 2008 DDA modalities, plus increase of 
non-FTA applied tariffs to their maximum level since 1995, capped by the new, post-DDA 
bound tariffs. 
6.  FTA-HICs: An FTA covering 95 percent of tariff lines implemented among high- income 
countries. 
7.  Max and FTA-HICs Scenario: A combination of the Up-to-the-Max and FTA-HIC 
scenarios. 
The DDA Scenario 
The first scenario represents a successful Doha outcome based on the July 2008 modalities. After seven 
years of trade talks, market access modalities have reached a high level of sophistication. Even if the 
general philosophy is simple, progressive tariff-cut formulas for both agricultural and nonagricultural 
goods have introduced flexibilities with different degrees of special and differential treatment for different 
groups of developing countries. Following our previous work (Laborde, Martin, and van der 
Mensbrugghe 2008 and Berisha et al. 2008), this scenario implements all the details of these modalities
9 
in terms of market access, including tariff-cutting formulas, country and product flexibilities (sensitive 
and special products), and special provisions for tariff escalation, tropical products, and long-standing 
preferences. This scenario does not account for changes in the sectoral initiative resulting from the lack of 
agreement on this issue.  
For the duty-free-quota-free market access initiative for LDCs and OECD members (excluding 
South Korea but including Mexico and Turkey), we assume a 3 percent exemption clause in terms of 
products.
10 Export subsidies are phased out by 2013 for developed countries.  
Concerning domestic support, the DDA scenario includes the overall constraint on overall trade-
distorting support (OTDS) for the US and the EU. In contrast with most traditional exercises, where 
domestic support commitments are translated as ad valorem or specific subsidy caps for current applied 
policies, we explicitly introduce the OTDS as an overall limit for domestic support spending for each 
year. In the dynamic context, and due to the growth of production in the baseline, the initial agricultural 
subsidy rates based on 2004 prices may lead to a violation of the new commitments. In our simulation, it 
appears that only the US
11 will face a real constraint, forcing it to modify its distorting production 
programs. With the reduction scheme of the OTDS on one hand, and increasing production on the other, 
we estimate that subsidy rates on production and some production factors should start to decrease by 2011 
                                                      
9 A full description of the modalities implemented in this study is provided in Laborde, Martin, and van der Mensbrugghe 
(2008). This scenario is based on the May 2008 modalities (WTO 2008a and WTO 2008b). 
10 This scenario mimics Scenario F in Berisha et al. (2008). 
11 The recent CAP (Common Agricultural Policy) reform allows the EU to largely reallocate domestic programs to the green 
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and will need to be halved by 2025 to stay below the final US$16.4 bn limit. Any domestic support 
reduction will affect all sectors uniformly. Since this paper focuses on tariffs and tariff changes across 
scenarios, we do not introduce program-specific modeling of domestic support policies, nor do we 
develop a political economy model to explain how reduced domestic support should be handled across 
commodities. Our goal is purely to show that, even if they do not drive domestic support reduction today, 
the new OTDS commitments will have real value in the medium run. The consequences of this treatment 
are discussed in Appendix B. 
Due to the complexity of integrating other DDA elements into the simulations, we omit other 
sources of potential gains, such as liberalization in services, WTO rules, trade facilitation, and intellectual 
property rights. 
The Up-to-the-Bound Scenario 
Two protectionist scenarios are analyzed in order to offer a contrasting picture to the DDA scenario. The 
first option, the Up-to-the-Bound scenario, examines the possibility of WTO member countries raising 
their tariffs to their Uruguay Round bound level over a five-year period (2009-14). The scenario assumes 
that the entire binding overhang will be eliminated. For unbound lines, the existing average binding 
overhang is used to compute new tariff targets.
12 This scenario represents a strong increase in protection 
by eliminating all unilateral liberalization, but it does not represent an open trade war between WTO 
members. Existing commitments are still respected.
13 
On one hand, this scenario may appear extreme, especially given that during the Uruguay Round, 
many developing countries used a ceiling option to bind their tariffs to levels they have never (and will 
never) apply. Countries also apply zero tariffs on a large selection of raw materials and imported inputs, 
even if the existing bound tariffs are strictly positive. On the other hand, the Up-to-the-Bound scenario is 
not the worst that could be anticipated; many countries have not bound their import tariffs and remain 
unconstrained by any upward limitation. In our scenario, in some cases applying the country-specific 
existing binding overhang can underestimate the desire to impose high protection on specific products. 
Moreover, antidumping duties and safeguard mechanisms can be activated and can restrict trade, even in 
rich countries where binding overhangs are either limited or nonexistent.   
Under this scenario, only MFN applied rates and nonreciprocal, preferential rates are modified. 
The only nonreciprocal program maintained is the EU’s EBA initiative; this is due to the way in which 
this program has been implemented and renewed in the EU’s legislation.
14 
The Bound&DDA Scenario 
The Up-to-the-Bound and Bound&DDA scenarios are designed to measure the extent to which the 
implementation of the July 2008 package could reduce the cost of a new trade war by lowering bound 
duties. The Bound&DDA scenario combines the DDA and the Up-to-the-Bound scenarios, but uses 
bound duties derived from the July 2008 package. Therefore, the difference between this scenario and the 
Up-to-the Bound scenario is the extent to which a new trade agreement under the DDA could reduce the 
capacity of WTO members to augment MFN tariffs. It is also important to note that the treatment of 
bound tariffs is very different under this scenario compared with the Up-to-the-Bound scenario. Contrary 
to the earlier scenario, under which an average binding margin is applied uniformly based on existing 
binding overhang, under the Bound&DDA scenario we apply the new DDA constraints in terms of 
binding rules (based on the Jean, Laborde, and Martin [2008] political economy approach combined with 
                                                      
12 Technically, we estimate the following relationship for each country: Bound_Rate = a MFN_rate + b on bound lines; we 
then apply parameters a and b on the applied MFN rate to build theoretical bound tariffs for the unbound lines. 
13 Even while countries adhere to their commitments, we may imagine that they could use additional tools (e.g., using 
contingent protection and initiating litigation for the purpose of retaliation) to increase their protection above bound levels. 
14 It is important to note that, given the implementation of the EPA between the EU and the ACP countries, LDC preferences 
in the EU are not protected by a bilateral agreement. 12 
past trade policy behavior). As above, only MFN applied rates and nonreciprocal preferential rates are 
modified.  
The Up-to-the-Max Scenario  
To adopt a more realistic protectionist scenario, historical data are used to determine the highest applied 
protection rate implemented by every country during 1995-2006. We then select the minimum level from 
the historical maximum and the existing bound level. This scenario corresponds to the situation in which 
governments apply the most adverse trade policies of the past ten years, while still respecting their 
Uruguay Round commitments.
15 On an historical basis, tariffs evolve in response to changes in world 
prices, domestic production structures, and political pressures. This scenario allows us to capture the 
share of binding overhang that is really relevant for private agents, because it corresponds with the 
behavior exhibited by policymakers since the end of the Uruguay Round. It is important to note that for 
all scenarios with increasing tariffs, the preferential tariffs protected by bilateral or regional agreements 
remain unchanged.  
The Max&DDA Scenario 
Under this scenario, we combine the scenario of the DDA plus the Up-to-the Max scenario by using the 
new bound duties defined in the July 2008 package, so the tariff applied is the lesser of the highest duty 
applied during 1995-2006 and the newly defined bound duty. The difference between these scenarios can 
also be represented as the benefit from the DDA as an insurance scheme against trade wars. As above, 
only MFN applied rates and nonreciprocal preferential rates are modified.  
FTA-HICs Scenario 
Another potential effect of failed Doha negotiations is that countries may be more likely to seek market 
access gains through bilateral or plurilateral agreements. It is possible to imagine a multiplication of FTAs 
that would further complicate what is already “a spaghetti bowl” of agreements, thereby increasing trade 
costs due to a lack of transparency and the complexity of overlapping rules of origin. However, this study 
focuses on the implementation of one plurilateral agreement (i.e., the FTA-HICs scenario). This scenario 
assumes that HICs will adopt a zero-for-zero approach, whereby each member of the plurilateral 
agreement will liberalize 95 percent of its tariff lines.
16 Several considerations justify this choice. First, 
North-South and South-South negotiations are still difficult to conduct, are often delayed, and—especially 
within the South—are weakly enforced. Second, HICs will place the responsibility for the failure of the 
DDA on a lack of commitment on the part of MICs to open their own markets. In return, the HICs may 
decide to move more quickly toward freer trade with countries ready to do this. Finally, by implementing 
a 95 percent duty-free agreement, rich countries will comply with article XXIV under the GATT, and will 
protect their sensitive sectors, especially agriculture. At the same time, an FTA will not entail 
commitments regarding export subsidies and domestic support policies, which is another delicate issue 
for some OECD countries. 
The Max&FTA-HICs Scenario 
The Max&FTA-HICs scenario combines a rise in protection to past levels with the implementation of an 
HIC FTA. An HIC FTA will lead to increased differences between insiders and outsiders and will trigger 
retaliatory trade blocks. Thus, this scenario may represent a stage that could follow the FTA-HIC 
scenario. 
                                                      
15 During this period, trade policies have been adjusted in reaction to highly contrasting situations (i.e., slow vs. fast growth, 
low vs. high agricultural prices, and so on). 
16 Nonliberalized products are selected using the Jean, Laborde, and Martin (2008) political economy criterion. 13 
4. RESULTS 
The Impact on Protection and Market Access 
Figure 2 displays the consequences of the seven scenarios modeled herein on average world tariffs. Under 
the DDA scenario, projected world protection is reduced from 4.6 to 3.6 percent, representing a 22 
percent reduction compared with the baseline. In contrast, under the Up-to-the-Bound scenario, on 
average, protection nearly doubles. The elimination of unilateral tariff reductions enacted during the past 
ten years, represented by the Up-to-the-Max scenario, has a more limited impact but still represents an 
increase of 41 percent in world tariffs compared with the baseline (from 4.6 percent to 6.4 percent). Even 
with its limited geographical scope, the implementation of the FTA-HICs scenario affects global-level 
protection through its impact on important economic zones, particularly trade inside “the Quad” (Canada, 
the EU, Japan and the US). This FTA will exclude many agricultural products; consequently, the average 
rate of tariff cut under this scenario is lower for agricultural products (5 percent) than for nonagricultural 
products (11 percent).  
The implementation of the July 2008 package has a significant impact on potential future trade 
wars. If the DDA is not implemented, current protection could double if countries resort to bound levels; 
in contrast, protection increases by only 41 percent when the DDA is implemented. Under the 
Max&DDA scenario, world protection increases by only 5 percent, whereas under the Up-to-the-Max 
scenario it increases by 41 percent. These comparisons show the extent to which the implementation of 
the July 2008 package could allow us to avoid the costs of protectionism.  
As is clearly shown in Figure 2, variations in protection differ even more when we look 
specifically at agriculture. World agricultural protection decreases by 23 percent if the July 2008 package 
is implemented, whereas it is 1.8 times higher if bound duties are applied. When we compare world 
agricultural protection under the DDA (12.6 percent) to that under a global resort to bound duties (29.4 
percent), we get a ratio of 1 to 2.33. When the reference is maximum duties applied in the 1995-2006 
period, the ratio is 1 to 1.63. If we compare world bound protection in agriculture with and without the 
implementation of the DDA, the ratio is 1 to 1.32.  
Figure 2.  Average world tariffs by scenario, 2025 levels 
 
Source:  MAcMapHS6v2.1, TRAINS, and authors’ calculations using the reference group-weighting scheme. 14 
Table 2 and Table 3 present the results of protection applied on imports and faced by exports, 
respectively, for groups of countries. The DDA scenario cuts the applied protection by one-third for HICs 
and by one-tenth for MICs, which is a significant achievement compared with previous rounds of the 
GATT. This scenario also locks existing market access due to unilateral liberalization on the basis of 
MFN or nonreciprocal preferences. Indeed, under the Up-to-the-Bound scenario, protection increases by 
48 percent in HICs, by 132 percent in MICs, and by 270 percent in LDCs compared with the baseline 
levels. Under the Up-to-the-Max scenario, protection in the same three groups of countries increases by 
23 percent, 56 percent, and 67 percent, respectively. Interestingly, for HICs, the combination of the FTA 
and the increase in tariffs applied to other countries to past-observed levels (Max&FTA-HICs scenario) 
leaves the average level of applied protection unchanged. 
Table 2.  Protection applied on imports, by country category and scenario 
    Scenario 
    1  2  3  4 5 6  7 
Country  




















HICs      
  Agricultural products  15.6  10.3 22.9 15.6 18.5 13.6 14.3 16.7
  Industrial goods  2.2  1.4 3.3 2.1  2.8 1.6  1.6 2.0
All sectors  3.0  1.9 4.4 3.1  3.7 2.3 2.4 2.9
  MICs       
  Agricultural products  18.3  17.6 40.8 33.4 24.9 23.0 18.3 24.9
  Industrial goods  7.9  7.0 17.9 12.2  12.9 10.2  7.9 12.9
All sectors  8.6  7.8 19.8 14.0  13.3 10.9  8.6 13.3
  LDCs       
  Agricultural products  11.6  11.6 65.3 65.5 20.0 20.0 11.6 20.0
  Industrial goods  9.2  9.2 31.4 34.2  16.5 14.3  9.2 16.5
All sectors  9.8  9.8 36.1 38.6  16.3 14.6 9.8 16.3
  World       
  Agricultural products  16.4  12.6 29.4 22.2 20.6 16.7 15.5 19.3
  Industrial goods  3.9  3.0 7.6 5.3  5.7 4.2  3.5 5.2
All sectors  4.6  3.6 9.0 6.4 6.4 4.8  4.2 5.9
Sources:  MAcMapHS6v2.1, TRAINS, and authors’ calculations using the reference group-weighting scheme. 
Notes: HICs indicates high-income countries; MICs, middle-income countries; and LDCs, least-developed 
countries. 
It is notable that implementation of the July 2008 package provides better access to HIC markets 
(from 3 percent down to 1.9 percent in all sectors, but from 15.6 percent to 10.3 percent in agriculture), 
whereas variation in the protection applied by MICs is small (from 8.5 percent down to 7.8 percent in all 
sectors), and that by LDCs is nonexistent. At the same time, the July 2008 package gives world exporters 
an insurance policy against the potential rise in applied protection by MICs and LDCs: while protection 
increases from 8.6 percent to 14 percent (the bound level) when the DDA is applied, it  increases to 19.8 
percent when it is not. As far as LDCs are concerned, when we compare the Up-to-the-Bound and 
Bound&DDA scenarios, tariffs increase more in the second instance. Indeed, the flexibilities granted by 15 
the DDA modalities to bind tariffs will provide more freedom to increase tariffs compared to the 
homogenous binding overhang rate applied to build the Up-to-the-Bound scenario. By using the political 
economy model in binding tariffs combined with the new rules, governments can achieve higher levels of 
protection than are possible using a homogenous rate of binding overhang computed on existing bound 
tariff lines. This is consistent with the idea that unbound products are most sensitive. 
Table 3.  Protection faced by exports, by country category and scenario 
    Scenario 
   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Country  




















HICs           
  Agricultural products  16.1  11.9 28.5 21.1 20.3 16.1 14.6 18.2
  Industrial goods  3.8  3.0 7.7 5.4 5.6 4.2 3.2 4.8
  All sectors  4.6  3.6 9.0 6.4 6.5 5.0 3.9 5.6
MICs    
  Agricultural products  17.1  13.8 30.6 23.7 21.2 17.7 17.1 21.2
  Industrial goods  4.0  3.0 7.5 5.0 5.9 4.0 4.0 5.9
  All sectors  4.6  3.6 8.9 6.4 6.3 4.6 4.6 6.3
LDCs    
  Agricultural products  9.9  8.2 30.2 24.0 14.6 12.6 9.9 14.6
  Industrial goods  3.9  2.7 9.4 6.2 9.0 4.5 3.9 9.0
  All sectors  4.0  3.2 11.7 8.5 7.3 4.7 4.0 7.3
World    
  Agricultural products  16.4  12.6 29.4 22.2 20.6 16.7 15.5 19.3
  Industrial goods  3.9  3.0 7.6 5.3 5.7 4.2 3.5 5.2
  All sectors  4.6  3.6 9.0 6.4 6.4 4.8 4.2 5.9
Sources:  MAcMapHS6v2.1, TRAINS, and authors’ calculations using the reference group weighting scheme. 
Notes:  HICs indicates high-income countries; MICs, middle-income countries; and LDCs, least-developed countries. 
It is worthwhile to examine which group of countries is most severely affected by these scenarios 
in terms of access to foreign markets (Table 3). In relative terms, the DDA scenario manages to deliver 
homogeneous market access gains with an average decrease of about 20 percent of the tariffs faced by 
three groups of countries: from 4.6 percent to 3.6 percent for both HIC and MIC countries, and from 4 to 
3.2 percent for LDCs. In contrast, the other scenarios have significantly different results. Although the 
two protectionist scenarios have similar effects for HICs and MICs (97 and 93 percent, respectively, 
under the Up-to-the-Bound scenario and 42 and 37 percent, respectively, under the Up-to-the-Max 
scenario), the LDCs are more severely affected due to losses of nonreciprocal preferences,
17 in particular, 
the protection faced by LDCs is nearly tripled in the US and Japan. Consequently, the implementation of 
the DDA is of great interest to LDCs, not only because it improves access to foreign markets (albeit at the 
price of eroded preferences), but also because it locks unilateral schemes, particularly the most recent 
                                                      
17 With the exception of the EU market, where the EBA program is maintained. 16 
initiatives. DDA implementation will eliminate a potential rise in the protection facing their exports: 
based on the maximum protection faced during 1995-2006, the protection facing LDC exports increases 
from 4.6 to 6.4 percent if the DDA is not implemented, but only by 4.8 percent if the DDA is applied. Of 
course the FTA-HICs scenario only benefits HIC countries (a 14 percent decrease in faced protection) but 
to a lesser degree than the DDA scenario. 
Economic Impacts 
The MIRAGE model is used to assess the economic impacts of these different tariff and domestic support 
scenarios to 2025.  
Economic Impacts at the Global Level 
Table 4 indicates the global results for all scenarios for the world economy in 2025 compared with the 
baseline. Under the DDA scenario, focusing only on part of the DDA agenda (the tariff liberalization and 
domestic support discipline), we see that world trade increases in 2025 by a mere 1.9 percent (US$363 
bn), and real world income by US$59 bn. This confirms the findings of other studies (see Decreux and 
Fontagné 2006 and Bouët, Mevel, and Orden 2006), except that the gains here are slightly lower, mainly 
because the baseline includes numerous RTAs that already reduce applied tariffs without DDA 
implementation. Nevertheless, these numbers are driven by the assumption that no major political shock 
will occur if the DDA is not signed; this assumption should be considered carefully.  
Table 4.  Global changes in exports and welfare by scenario, 2025 
    Scenario 
   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Country  



















Change from baseline in 2025 (percent) 
Global goods and services exports  
by volume  1.90 –9.93 –5.70 –4.23 –1.19 0.56 –3.48
Agrifood sector    5.47 –20.26 –13.42 –9.36 –4.52 0.62 –8.53
Industry   1.96 –9.77 –5.07 –4.36 –0.95 0.66 –3.50
Global welfare     0.09 –0.51 –0.25 –0.19 –0.04 0.01 –0.19
North     0.07 –0.32 –0.20 –0.14 –0.08 0.02 –0.12
South    0.13 –1.00 –0.35 –0.32 0.06 –0.02 –0.35
Change from baseline in 2025 (value in constant 2004 US$ bn) 
Global goods and services exports  
by volume  363 –1,899 –1,090 –808 –227 108  –665
Agrifood sector    73 –269 –178 –124 –60 8  –113
Industry    279 –1,389 –721 –621 –135 94  –497
Global welfare     59 –353 –169 –134 –26 4  –128
North    33 –156 –100 –70 –37 –9  –59
South    26 –197 –69 –64 11 –5  –69
Source: Authors’ calculations based on MIRAGE simulations. 
Notes: Welfare changes are computed as the equivalent variation. Export volumes are defined using a Fisher index. 
Intra-EU trade flows are excluded.
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In case of the Up-to-the-Bound scenario, world trade contracts by 9.9 percent (US$1,899 bn) and 
world real income by US $353 bn. In the case of the less damaging Up-to-the-Max scenario, world trade 
declines less (by 4.2 percent or US$808 bn), but the increase in duties has a particular impact on 
agricultural exports (-9.4 percent), which would negatively affect the agricultural exports of developing 
countries (-11.5 percent). In addition, the export of industrial goods from developing countries also faces 
a substantial reduction (- 4.4 percent).  
In the case of implementation of the July 2008 package and a subsequent increase in protection to 
bound levels, the decrease in world exports is only US$1,090 bn, whereas it is US$1,899 bn if the DDA is 
not applied. Thus, according to this assessment, DDA implementation has the capacity to prevent a 
potential loss of US$809 bn in trade. If protectionism increases to the maximum protection applied during 
the 1996-2006 period, the DDA acts as an insurance policy worth US$581 bn in trade. 
It is important to note that the establishment of an HIC free-trade zone increases world trade by 
only 0.6 percent, because this agreement removes tariff barriers between countries that already operate 
under near free-trade conditions while at the same time allowing them to exempt 5 percent of their highly 
protected products from this process. This is not a major shock for world trade compared with 
protectionist scenarios or the failure of the DDA. While the HIC-FTA scenario benefits developed 
countries, resulting in a 0.02 percent increase in their real income, the trade diversion effect means that 
developing countries are negatively affected, incurring a 0.02 percent decline in their real income. When 
combined with the Up-to-the-Max scenario, the HIC-FTA scenario does not prevent a contraction of 
world trade, which declines by 3.5 percent (scenario Max&HIC-FTA).  
The Economic Impact at the Country Level 
In this section, we focus on the impact of various scenarios on national macroeconomic variables. In order 
to simplify the presentation, we focus on 17 countries/zones rather than the full 27. Table 5 illustrates 
how the various scenarios affect the value of the countries’ exports. The Doha agreement is not projected 
to have any effects that are surprising in comparison to previous assessments. However, a look at the 
protectionist scenarios without implementation of the DDA reveals that some countries could be greatly 
affected by a global resort to protectionism. Brazil, for example, is highly specialized in agriculture, 
which is particularly affected by an increase in protectionism. Recall that the Up-to-the-Bound scenario 
increases world agricultural protection by 13 percentage points, but only increases that for industry by 3.7 
percentage points (see Table 2). For this reason, Brazil’s exports are especially reduced under the Up-to-
the-Bound scenario (by 25.6 percent), which begs the question: Could the DDA serve as an insurance 
scheme against a potential rise of protectionism for Brazil? According to our findings, if the DDA is 
implemented, Brazil’s exports would be reduced by only 7.4 percent if bound duties are adopted. The 
same mechanism is in play for the Up-to-the-Max and Max&DDA scenarios, but the magnitude of the 
results are significantly smaller.   
Traditionally, assessments of the Doha agreement conclude that the potential effects for the EU 
and the US are small. This study arrives at the same conclusion (e.g., the increase in EU exports by 2025 
is only 2.9 percent). However, we also assess the benefits of the DDA. First, we compare it (as a 
cooperative scenario) with non cooperative scenarios; for example, we find that the Up-to the-Bound 
scenario results in a 10.4 percent decline of EU exports and a 2.9 percent decline of US exports. Second, 
we examine how the DDA prevents the loss of exports related to increased protection; for example, the 
difference between the Up-to-the-Bound and Bound&DDA scenarios is 5 percent for the EU and 2.4 
percent for the US. Table 4 illustrates that this new evaluation emphasizes the importance of the DDA for 
these large economies.  
Variations in exports are also explained through the macroeconomic closure of the model, which 
supposes that each current account must remain constant. Under the Up-to-the-Bound and Up-to-the-Max 
scenarios, each country increases its applied protection, thereby decreasing its imports; in this case, the 
real exchange rate may appreciate in order to keep the current account constant. 18 



















ASEAN  LICs  2.1 –18.7 –30.8 –10.7  –5.3  0.1 –10.8 
ASEAN  MICs  2.2  –16.3 –8.0 –8.1 –3.8 –0.2 –8.4 
ANZCERTA  3.3 –9.4 –1.0 –3.0  1.4  1.5 –1.0 
Bangladesh  5.8  –51.8  –52.5 –9.6  –10.8 –0.5  –10.1 
Brazil  4.0  –25.6 –7.4 –5.9 –0.7 –0.2 –6.2 
Canada  0.5 –1.9 –1.7 –0.8  0.1  0.2 –0.4 
Central  Africa  0.1  –28.9  –26.9 –7.1 –7.1 –0.1 –7.2 
China, excluding 
Hong  Kong  4.7 –3.3 –1.2 –1.5  3.9 –0.1 –1.8 
European  Union  2.9  –10.4 –5.4 –8.6 –4.6  1.6 –6.3 
India  1.8 –38.9 –12.7 –12.7  –3.1  –0.4 –13.1 
Japan  3.2 –3.0  1.1 –1.7  2.1  1.3 –0.4 
Mexico  0.6  –13.2 –5.2 –3.6 –2.0 –0.5 –4.2 
Middle East and 
North  Africa  4.4  –11.8 –1.4 –5.1 –0.2 –0.2 –5.3 
Pakistan  2.1 –42.0 –35.3 –27.6 –20.9  –0.5 –28.1 
Turkey  0.6  –12.4 –7.8 –5.7 –4.7 –0.8 –6.8 
US  1.9 –2.9 –0.5 –1.0  1.0  1.6  0.5 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on MIRAGE simulations. 
Notes: Intra-EU trade flows are excluded. ASEAN indicates Association of South East Asian Nations; ANZCERTA, 
the Australia and New Zealand group; LICs, low-income countries; and MICs, middle-income countries. 
Table 5 presents the welfare impacts of various scenarios. The DDA scenario yields gains for all 
regions except Mexico.
18 This loss can be explained by an erosion of preferences toward Canada and the 
US in the case of an agreed multilateral liberalization. In general, welfare gains under the DDA scenario 
are small; they are significant only for Brazil, Bangladesh, and the ASEAN MIC zone. 
A rise of protectionism would mainly hurt MICs and LDCs. As pointed out, in the case of the Up-
to-the-Bound scenario, the relative loss of welfare is three times larger for developing countries than for 
developed countries (see Table 4). Asian developing countries are particularly affected (see Bangladesh, 
India, and Pakistan in Table 6). The implementation of the DDA is important for these countries as an 
insurance against the risk of trade wars, particularly for India. We  see a few cases for which increasing 
protectionism is beneficial. For instance, Canada takes advantage of increased preferential margins into 
NAFTA markets, while limited increases of its own tariffs improve the country’s terms of trade (optimal 
tariff argument) and generate only small domestic distortions. 
                                                      
18 Nigeria and the rest of Eastern Africa are also affected by slight decreases in welfare.  19 




















ASEAN  LICs  0.4 –1.7 –1.3 –1.2 –0.1  0.0 –1.2 
ASEAN  MICs  0.6 –1.3 –0.2 –0.4 –0.1 –0.1 –0.6 
ANZCERTA  0.1 –0.2 –0.1 –0.1  0.0  0.0 –0.0 
Bangladesh  0.7 –2.0 –2.0 –0.6 –0.6 –0.0 –0.6 
Brazil  0.3 –0.4  0.1 –0.1  0.2 –0.0 –0.1 
Canada  0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1  –0.0 0.1 
Central  Africa  0.0  –0.0 0.2 0.8 0.8  –0.0 0.8 
China, excluding 
Hong Kong 
0.1 –0.5  0.2 –0.2  0.1 –0.0 –0.2 
European  Union  0.1 –0.5 –0.4 –0.3 –0.2  0.0 –0.2 
India  0.0 –1.8 –0.8 –0.4 –0.1 –0.0 –0.4 
Japan  0.2 –0.3  0.0 –0.1  0.1  0.1 –0.1 
Mexico  –0.1 –1.7 –0.6 –0.2 –0.1 –0.1 –0.3 
Middle East and 
North Africa 
0.1 –0.6 –0.2 –0.2 –0.0 –0.0 –0.2 
Pakistan  0.2 –2.1 –2.2 –2.0 –1.7 –0.0 –2.1 
Turkey  0.1 –0.6 –0.3 –0.4 –0.3 –0.1 –0.5 
US  0.0 –0.2 –0.1 –0.1 –0.0  0.0 –0.0 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on MIRAGE simulations. 
Notes:  Intra-EU trade flows are excluded. ASEAN indicates the Association of Southeast Asian nations; 
ANZCERTA, the Australia and New Zealand group; LICs, low-income countries; and MICs, middle-income 
countries. 
As illustrated by the Canadian case, tariff changes—either generated by a country’s own policy 
reform or that of other countries—may have different, even opposite, effects on welfare. Decomposition 
of the mechanisms that affect welfare is crucial to understanding the results. In particular, it is important 
to assess the strength of the “what I do is what I get” argument. Indeed, in the context of changing global 
trade policy, a country will be affected both by changes in its own tariffs (domestic policy effect) and by 
changes in its partners’ tariffs (the foreign policy effect). Due to intracountry reallocation of resources, 
imported inputs, and the model closure (that is, the fixed current account), it is difficult for us to speak 
about “import-led effects” and “export-led effects.” Both domestic and foreign policy effects have 
negative and positive outcomes. As previously stated, for a domestic tariff increase we have (a) a positive 
effect on welfare related to the “optimal tariff” argument, and (b) a negative effect on welfare led by 
increasing distortions in domestic economies; while for a foreign tariff increase we have (a) a positive 
effect on exporters benefiting from preferences on increasingly protected markets, and (b) a negative 
effect on exporters facing increased barriers. 20 
Figure 3.  Relative impacts of foreign and domestic policies on welfare results, Up-to-the Max 
scenario 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on MIRAGE simulations. 
Notes: LIC indicates low-income countries; MIC, middle-income countries; ANZCERTA, the Australia and New 
Zealand group; and MENA, the Middle East and North Africa. 
Keeping in mind that the CGE effects are not additive and that any decomposition is path-
dependent, we use a methodology aimed at reducing this issue (Laborde 2009) to compute normalized 
relative effects of “domestic” and “foreign” reform. As is clear from Figure 3, in the case of Up-to-the-to 
Max scenario, we see that different countries respond differently to these conflicting effects. Several large 
countries/groups of countries (Canada, ASEAN, Brazil, India, EU27 European Union 27 countries, and so 
on) can benefit from their own tariff increases. On the other hand, in some small countries, recent 
adoptions of highly distorting trade policies mean that a return to high tariffs would be detrimental. 
For most exporters, tariff increases on destination markets will have drastic negative effects and 
will dominate the welfare changes. This is particularly true for Asian countries (e.g., China and Japan) 
that have no preferential access. Except for a few countries that benefit from large preferential access 
(e.g., Canada and Mexico), the overall rise in protection at the global level still delivers positive effects: 
the increased value of existing preferences outweighs the loss of market access in third countries.  21 
Table 7. Changes in factor remunerations for three scenarios compared with baseline, 2025 (percent) 
 
Real return 
 to capital 































































































































ASEAN LICs  –0.2  –4.3  –8.8 0.9 –7.2  –8.8 0.4  –4.1  –7.6  0.8 –6.6 –8.9  0.4  –5.5  –9.4 
ASEAN MICs  0.3  –5.4  –3.2 1.9 –6.7  –5.4 1.0  –6.1  –2.1  1.6 –7.5 –5.4  0.8  –7.4  –3.4 
ANZCERTA  0.2  –0.4  0.1 3.3 –5.4  –1.6 0.2  –0.8  –0.2  3.3 –4.3 –0.8  0.1  –0.8  –0.2 
Bangladesh  –0.5  –4.7  –4.8 6.8 10.8  10.8  –0.5  –6.0  –6.2 4.7 6.0 6.0  –0.9  –6.2  –6.3 
Brazil  0.3  –2.0  –1.0 4.8  –10.3  –1.6 0.1  –0.5  0.2  4.2 –8.5 –1.8 –0.1  –2.0  –0.8 
Canada  0.3  –0.2  –0.1 3.0 –3.8  –1.6 0.1  –0.2  0.1  1.9 –2.0 –0.2  0.1  –0.2  –0.1 
Central Africa  0.0  –8.3  –8.1 –0.1  –4.5 –4.1 –0.0  1.4  1.8  0.0 –5.7 –5.1 –0.0  –2.6  –2.4 
China, excluding 
Hong Kong 
0.1  –0.1  –0.6 0.7 –0.1 0.0 0.5  –0.9  –0.2  0.6 –0.2 –0.0  0.5  –0.6  –0.2 
European Union  0.2  –0.3  –0.1 –1.8  –0.1 –1.1  0.2  –0.8  –0.5 –1.9 –0.6 –1.3  0.2  –0.4  –0.2 
India  –0.1  –2.9  –2.2 0.3  2.8 3.7 0.0  –5.3  –2.0 0.2 0.1 1.6 0.0  –4.4  –2.0 
Japan  0.3  –0.0  0.0 –6.5  1.0 –2.4  0.5  –0.4  0.0 –5.2  0.8 –2.6  0.4  –0.3  0.0 
Mexico  0.2  0.4  0.3 1.9 –1.1  –0.1  –0.1  –3.4  –1.2  1.3 –1.5 –0.3 –0.1  –2.6  –1.0 
Middle East and 
North Africa 
0.3  –1.6  –0.4 2.5  1.5 1.7 0.3  –2.4  –0.5 2.0 0.6 1.2 0.2  –2.0  –0.4 
Pakistan  –0.2  –3.1  –1.9 0.7  0.8 1.1 0.1  –6.6  –7.6  0.6 –1.5 –1.2  0.1  –6.8  –6.7 
Turkey  0.0  –2.9  –2.0 0.4 –0.0  –0.7 0.1  –1.4  –0.5  0.4 –0.6 –0.8  0.1  –2.0  –1.2 
US  –0.2  0.0  0.2 –5.8  –1.4 –0.6  0.1  –0.3  –0.2 –2.7 –0.7 –0.2  0.1  –0.2  –0.1 
Source:  Authors’ calculations based on MIRAGE simulations. 
Notes: ASEAN indicates Association of Southeast Asian Nations; LIC, low-income countries; MIC, middle-income 
countries; and ANZCERTA, the Australia and New Zealand group. Real factor returns are computed as the nominal 
value deflated by the representative household price index. 
 
Finally, we examine how the real remuneration of specific factors (e.g., unskilled agricultural 
labor) varies under the DDA, Up-to-the-Bound, and Bound&DDA scenarios (see Table 7). The objective 
here is simply to illustrate the differences in how some productive factors are affected by further 
liberalization of a country’s economy or by a global resort to protectionism, and whether the “insurance 
scheme” discussed herein takes effect at these factor levels.   
In agricultural countries, such as Australia, New Zealand, and Brazil, productive factors related to 
agriculture (such as land and unskilled agricultural labor) clearly support the DDA and oppose increased 
global protection to bound levels. In Brazil, for example, real remuneration of land and unskilled 
agricultural labor increases by 4.8 and 4.2 percent, respectively, if the DDA is implemented, whereas they 
decline by 10.3 percent and 8.5 percent, respectively, if the Up-to-the-Bound scenario is implemented. 
The DDA also provides insurance for land and unskilled agricultural labor in these countries; under the 
Bound&DDA scenario, remuneration declines, but to a lesser extent (1.6 and 1.8 percent, respectively, in 
the case of Brazil). The same mechanism works in Asian MICs and in Central Africa, where the DDA 
provides insurance for these poor countries by circumventing the negative effects of increased global 
protectionism.  22 
In rich countries, such as Japan, Korea, and the EFTA (European Free Trade Association) 
countries, land and unskilled agricultural labor interests support increased protectionism and oppose 
further liberalization. In the case of the EU and the US, any reform will cause a decline in the real 
remuneration of these factors. Indeed, for the agricultural sectors in both regions, the DDA will have 
adverse effects (such as reduction in subsidies or protective tariffs), but tariff increases by trade partners 
will also hurt agricultural interests. In the case of the Up-to-the-Bound and Bound&DDA scenarios, the 
negative effects are smaller. 
It is notable that in rich countries (e.g., Australia and New Zealand, Canada, the EU, Japan, and 
the US), skilled labor and capital generally support increased multilateral trade openness, which increases 
their real remuneration, and oppose increased protectionism, which reduces their real remuneration. The 
differences in the real remuneration resulting from these trade policies are less than those related to land 
and unskilled agricultural labor; this can be explained by differences in the degree of intersectoral 
mobility. These results are consistent with the traditional Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson framework.  
What is really at Stake? 
Our present results provide a clear re-assessment of what is really at stake with regard to the Doha Round. 
A disagreement among WTO countries over the DDA would signal international noncooperation. If 
countries subsequently implement protectionist policies, the loss could be much greater. This exercise 
provides clear insight into what could be lost as a result of the failure of the DDA. A simple comparison 
reveals a potential loss of US$1,171 bn in world trade. Not only would the failure of the DDA prevent an 
increase of US$363 bn in world trade coming from new commitments on tariffs and domestic support, but 
a worldwide move toward protectionism would further cause world trade to contract by US$808 bn if the 
highest duties applied during the 1995-2006 are implemented (a realistic scenario). If an increase in 
bound duties is the relevant reference point, the potential cost of a failed DDA reaches US$2,262 bn in 
the volume of annual trade in 2025.  
Moreover, the DDA will not only increase trade, it will also reinforce binding commitments and 
reduce existing bound duties. As such, it will function for international public good by making the trade 
environment more secure and decreasing the costs associated with potential trade wars. We demonstrate 
this by comparing the application of bound duties based on their current levels with those based on the 
level of bound duties implied under the DDA; this exercise indicates that the DDA is worth US$809 bn in 
the volume trade and US$184 bn in real income.
19  
Strikingly, these conclusions are especially true for poor countries. In terms of real income, if we 
consider the real value of DDA as an insurance policy against protectionism, about two-thirds of the 
global value of US$184 bn (i.e., $128 bn) represents benefits to developing countries (see the comparison 
of the Up-to-the-Bound and Bound&DDA scenarios in Table 4). For these reasons, the DDA should 
finally be considered as a Development Round.   
                                                      
19 Calculated as 184 = –169  –  (–353) and 809  =   –1090  –  (–1899). 23 
5. CONCLUSION 
Recent studies assessing the potential impact of the DDA have concluded that a modest increase in world 
trade and real world income would result from its implementation. The present study, which is limited to 
tariffs and domestic support, does not invalidate these conclusions, but rather it examines the situation 
from a completely different perspective. The failure of a WTO agreement would be a clear sign of 
international noncooperation, triggering trade conflicts and litigation (especially between high-income 
and developing countries). Furthermore, it would be the first unsuccessful round despite being the first to 
focus on development and the first launched by the WTO.  
In the present period of economic stagnation, the risk is high that this failure would provide WTO 
members with an incentive to pursue non cooperative strategies via the adoption of protectionist policies. 
In that case, the loss would be much greater than the mere US$59 bn projected; there would be a large 
opportunity cost of failing to conclude the DDA.  
This study concludes that if world leaders fail to reach a final agreement under the DDA, the 
potential loss will be at least US$1,171 bn in foregone world trade if countries subsequently implement 
protectionist policies. Therefore, the stakes in Geneva are extremely high, and the July 2008 package 
should be considered the closest and most promising step toward a global development agenda in the 
current context of a world in turmoil. 
 24 
APPENDIX A. SECTOR AND GEOGRAPHIC DECOMPOSITION 
Table A.1.  Regional aggregation 
Country/region GTAP  7  code 




Central Africa  xac, xcf 
China and Hong Kong  hkg, chn 
European Union  roa, bgr, gbr, swe, esp, svn, svk, prt, pol, nld, mlt, lux, ltu, lva, ita, irl, hun, 
grc, deu, fra, fin, est, dnk, cze, cyp, bel, aut 





ASEAN LIC  xse, vnm, mmr, lao, khm, xea 
Mexico Mex 
MENA  xnf, tun, mar, egy 
Nigeria Nga 
Pakistan Pak 
Rest of Eastern Africa  xec, uga, eth 
Rest of Latin America  xcb, xca, pan, nic, gtm, cri, xsm, ven, ury, per, pry, ecu, col, chl, bol, arg 
Rest of OECD  xef, nor, che 
Rest of the world  xws, irn, geo, aze, arm, xsu, kgz, kaz, xer, xee, ukr, rus, hrv, blr, alb, xna, 
xoc 
Rest of South Asia  xsa, lka 
Rest of SADC  zwe, zmb, tza, moz, mus, mdg 
Rest of ECOWAS  xwf, sen 
South African Custom Unions  xsc, zaf, bwa, mwi 
Chinese Taipei and Singapore  sgp, twn 
Turkey Tur 
US Usa 
Notes: GTAP indicates the Global Trade Analysis Project; ASEAN, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations; 
LIC, low-income countries; MIC, middle-income countries; MENA, the Middle East and North Africa; OECD, the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development; SADC, the South African Development Community; 
and ECOWAS, the Economic Community of West African States. 25 
Table A.2.  Sectoral aggregation 
Sectors GTAP7  code 
Paddy and processed rice  pcr, pdr 
Beverages and tobacco  b_t 
Cereals Gro 
Food products   Frs 
Cattle Ome 
Meat products  Ofd 
Milk and dairy products  Nmm 
Other agricultural products  Rmk 
Plant-based fibers  wtr, gdt, ely 
Sugar  osg, ros, obs, isr, ofi, cmn, cns, wtr, gdt, ely 
Vegetables and fruit  Coa 
Wheat oil,  coa 
Chemical products  cmt, oap 
Electronics  omt, cmt, oap 
Forestry and fishery  i_s, nmm 
Leather  mp, nfm, i_s, nmm 
Machinery  omt, cmt, oap 
Mineral and metal products  Osd 
Motor vehicles and transport equipment  Omf 
Petroleum and coal products  Coa 
Primary products  Pdr 
Textiles Tex 
Wearing and apparel  atp, wtp, otp, trd 
Wood and paper  Wap 
Other manufactured products  ros, obs, isr, ofi, cmn, cns, wtr, gdt, ely 
Other services  c_b 
Transport and trade  Lum 
Note: GTAP indicates the Global Trade Analysis Project. 26 
APPENDIX B. MODELING THE OTDS CONSTRAINT IN A DYNAMIC SETTING 
As discussed in Section 3, we introduce the OTDS capping in the dynamic model. Compared with the 
standard approach, whereby domestic support is calculated from a base-year level and converted to an ad-
valorem equivalent,
20 we find that account for production value growth in the agricultural sector reduces 
the subsidy rate to respect the new WTO commitments. Focusing on agricultural production and exports, 
the following can be inferred: 
1.  The EU is virtually unaffected by subsidy reductions thanks to the recent CAP reform and the 
large share of green box payments in overall EU domestic support. In contrast, application of 
OTDS limits to US farmers will benefit EU producers and exporters. Overall, EU production 
under DDA tariff reduction contracts less with the OTDS treatment than without it (-1.17 
percent compared with -1.27 percent). 
2.  The situation in Brazil is magnified compared with that of the EU, in that Brazilian 
production increases more under the OTDS treatment (4.03 percent to 3.78 percent). 
3.  US production is directly affected by domestic support reduction (-1.5 percent in agricultural 
and agribusiness production instead of 0.1 percent). Moreover, for some sectors, the gaps 
arise from an expansion of the sugar and wheat sectors by 1 and 1.4 percent, respectively, to a 
contraction by –4 and –5.5 percent, respectively. 
                                                      
20 Since current US domestic support is below the new OTDS limits, it does not reduce current policies. 27 
Table B.1.  Agricultural export and production variations under the DDA scenario, with and 
without dynamic OTDS constraints 
   Brazil European  Union  US 
   Doha  scenario  
























A.  Exports by volume, 2025 (deviation from the baseline, percent) 
Agriculture and Agrofood  2.69   2.65   0.69   0.69   1.73   1.96  
Beverage and tobacco  3.90   4.05   1.58   1.57   5.69   5.74  
Cereals  –1.76   –3.93   –0.19   –0.87   –8.80   1.91  
Food products  4.35   4.30   1.34   1.19   6.90   7.40  
Cattle  –4.38   –5.97   2.50   1.67   –16.06   –0.32  
Meat products  31.35   31.41   –1.75   –2.05   11.62   13.25  
Milk and dairy products  69.66   68.54   –2.59   –3.06   –21.57   –15.70  
Other agricultural products  1.46   0.09   4.18   2.99   –5.52   4.27  
Paddy and processed rice  17.10   14.90   –7.38   –7.69   –6.21   2.96  
Sugar  3.70   3.80   –25.58   –25.72   15.53   12.48  
Vegetables and fruit  –1.28   –3.11   –0.29   –0.74   –6.27   2.74  
Wheat  –5.80   –7.30   6.42   4.63   –6.84   1.23  
B.  Production by volume, 2025 (deviation from the baseline, percent) 
Agriculture and Agrofood  4.03   3.78   –1.17   –1.27   –1.50   0.10  
Beverage and tobacco  –1.85   –1.69   0.02   0.03   0.17   –0.05  
Cereals  0.43   0.45   0.28   0.28   –0.07   –0.04  
Food products  3.88   3.30   –0.63   –0.86   –6.59   0.26  
Cattle  0.98   0.92   –0.15   –0.18   0.17   0.41  
Meat  12.07   12.07   –0.96   –1.11   –1.98   1.07  
Milk and dairy products  14.40   14.43   –5.38   –5.49   1.00   1.26  
Other agricultural products  1.94   1.90   –1.82   –1.89   –3.62   –2.57  
Paddy and processed rice  0.79   0.15   –0.13   –0.56   –5.67   0.03  
Sugar  0.30   0.21   –9.66   –9.99   –4.09   1.07  
Vegetables and fruit  –0.14   –0.14   –0.00   –0.01   0.11   –0.04  
Wheat  0.17   –1.79   1.59   1.12   –5.47   1.35  
Source: Authors calculations based on MIRAGE simulations. 
Note: OTDS indicates overall trade-distorting support. 28 
APPENDIX C. MOST FAVORED NATION TARIFF INCREASES, 1995-2006 
Table C.1.  Frequency of increases in most favored nation tariffs, 1995-2006 
Country NAMA  AMA  ALL 
Sudan  32.6 32.1 32.6 
Qatar  24.8 20.2 24.2 
Kuwait  24.7 20.1 24.1 
Madagascar  21.4 21.1 21.4 
Switzerland  19.2 26.0 20.1 
Rwanda  19.5 10.2 18.3 
Uzbekistan  17.5 20.4 17.9 
Kyrgyzstan  17.4 20.4 17.8 
Argentina  17.3 15.6 17.1 
Nicaragua  15.3 18.9 15.7 
Sri  Lanka  14.3 24.6 15.7 
Paraguay  15.4 10.8 14.7 
Morocco  14.3 17.1 14.6 
Uruguay 15.4  9.0  14.5 
Bhutan  11.5 24.0 13.2 
Lebanon  12.7 13.3 12.8 
Congo  12.4 14.4 12.7 
Afghanistan  11.0 16.9 11.8 
India  11.2 15.3 11.8 
Czech Republic  11.8  3.4  10.7 
Moldova,  Republic  of 10.1 13.3 10.5 
Nigeria 10.7  9.0  10.4 
     World  4.5  6.1  4.7 
     US  2.1  13.3  3.6 
     European Union  1.8  14.6  3.5 
     Japan  0.7  8.1  1.7 
    China  1.2  1.8  1.3 
Source:  TRAINS and authors’ calculations. 
Note:  NAMA indicates nonagricultural market access and AMA, agricultural market access. 
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